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Abstract
We study the formation of price bubbles on experimental asset markets where cash
earns interest. There are two main conclusions. The first is that paying positive interest
on cash is ineffective in diminishing bubbles through the reducing-active-participation
channel. The second is that the fundamental value generating process plays a critical
role in the formation of asset bubbles in the laboratory. In particular, bubbles tend to
occur whenever there is a conflict between the sign of the time trend of the fundamental
value and the sign of the expected dividend payment. This explanation is consistent
with all existing studies that analyze the role of fundamental value processes in inducing
bubbles on experimental asset markets.
JEL: C90, G10
Keywords: Asset Bubbles; Experimental Economics
1 Introduction
Bubbles refer to the phenomena associated with dramatic increases in asset prices ex-
ceeding the asset’s fundamental value. Bubbles occur when asset owners believe that they
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can resell the asset at an even higher price in the future. There are, broadly speaking, two ap-
proaches to modelling bubbles (see Brunnermeier 2009, and Scherbina 2013, for two surveys
of the literature on asset bubbles). The first approach assumes full rationality. One result
following this approach is that if all information is common knowledge, bubbles must be
infinitely-lived and grow at the same rate at the discount rate.1 The second approach deviates
from perfect rationality and assumes that at least some traders are behavioral.
There is a large literature of experimental studies on asset bubbles following the seminal
paper by Smith, Suchanek and Williams (1988, hereafter SSW). The experimental approach
constitutes a good complement to research using field data. The advantages include cleaner
control of trading environments and more clear definition of the fundamental value. In SSW,
subjects trade a single asset in a simple experimental asset market environment. The asset has
a finite lifetime and pays a random dividend in each period. The dividend payment and a fixed
terminal buyout value are the only sources of intrinsic value of the asset. The distribution of
the dividend process is common knowledge to all traders. Theory assuming full rationality
predicts that bubbles should not occur in the SSW setting. However, SSW find that the trading
price frequently exceeds the fundamental value, which provides strong evidence against full
rationality.2
SSW conjecture that bubbles on the experimental asset market are caused by the lack
of common knowledge of rationality leading to speculation. Lei, Noussair and Plott (2001)
reject the conjecture after observing bubbles even when resale opportunities are removed, and
suggest real irrationality as the source of bubbles. In addition, Lei, Noussair and Plott (2001)
find that removing speculative opportunities and simultaneously adding a commodity market
greatly reduce trading volumes and price bubbles on the asset market. As a result, they raise
the active-partcipation hypothesis that much of the trading activity that accompanies bubble
formation is due to the lack of an alternative activity during the experiment. More generally,
Lei, Noussair and Plott (2001) suggest that bubble formation in experimental asset markets
could have origins in aspects of the methodology of the experiment.
In this paper, we respond to Lei, Noussair and Plott (2001)’s call to explore the aspects
of the SSW design that may have contributed to irrational trading on experimental asset
markets. The framework that we choose deviates from the SSW design by the presence
of interest on cash: interest payments interpreted as interest earnings of a saving account, or
1The result that bubbles cannot occur in a finite horizon model is derived by backward induction. Since a
bubble cannot grow from the last trading period, there cannot be a bubble of this size in the second last period,
and so on.
2In the experimental literature, the fundamental value is usually calculated under the assumption of risk
neutrality. If agents are risk averse, the fundamental value should be lower than that implied by risk neutrality,
which makes the observation of pricing bubbles (relative to risk-neutral fundamental values) even more striking.
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interest charges interpreted as banking fees.3 The design allows us to investigate two possible
factors contributing to irrational trading in the SSW experimental asset markets. First, the
absence of interest payment on cash implies a low opportunity cost of speculation on the
asset market, which may have boosted active trading and bubble formation. This is related
to the point raised in Lei, Noussair and Plott (2001) that subjects tend to trade (irrationally)
due to boredom and the lack of alternative activities during the experiment. We study the
case where cash earns positive interest, which, although does not provide alternative trading
activities as in Lei, Noussair and Plott (2001), raises the opportunity cost of speculation on
the asset market and may induce more prudent trading and a lower trading volume.
Second, researchers have been suspecting that the particular fundamental value generating
process featured in the SSW design is inducive to confusion and irrational trading. The
presence of interest on cash allows us to alter the fundamental value process in more flexible
ways. Exploring a richer set of fundamental value processes helps us to identify the source
of confusion induced by the fundamental value process. Note that without interest payments,
two aspects of the fundamental value generating process – the sign of the expected dividend
payment and the time trend of the fundamental value – are tied together: positive, zero, or
negative expected dividend payments give rise to decreasing, flat, or increasing fundamental
values, respectively. The introduction of interest breaks the connection and allows for greater
flexibility in terms of more possible combinations of the sign of the dividend payment and
the sign of the time slope of the fundamental value.
To investigate how the two aspects of SSW design – low opportunity cost of speculation
and confusion about the fundamental value – may have contributed to irrational trading on
experimental asset markets, we design three treatments with interest on cash characterized by
different combinations of the sign of dividend payments and the sign of the time slope of the
fundamental value. In the first two treatments (treatments F and R), cash earns positive in-
terest, and stocks pay positive expected dividends. The difference lies in the dynamics of the
fundamental value: the fundamental value decreases in treatment F and increases in treatment
R. In the third set of experiment (treatment N), banking fees are charged on cash holdings,
the expected dividend is negative (interpreted as carrying costs), and the fundamental value
decreases over time. There is substantial overpricing in treatment F, very weak mispricing
in treatment R, and on average slight underpricing in treatment N. There is no significant
difference in terms of trading volume among the three treatments.
Treatment F shares similarities with a standard SSW design in that both designs have
positive dividend payments and decreasing fundamental values, and the main difference is
3Besides us, Bostian and Holt (2009) and Fischbacher, Hens and Zeisberger (2013) also feature interest on
cash. We will discuss the differences in Section 2, where we review related literature.
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that cash earns positive (no) interest in treatment F (SSW). Since treatment F involves sig-
nificant overpricing as with the SSW design, we can conclude that paying interest on cash
is not sufficient to suppress price bubbles through the reducing-active-participation channel.
In addition, a comparison between treatments F and R suggests that active participation is
not the reason why bubbles appear in treatment F, because the two treatments share similar
levels of trading intensity. A more likely reason for bubble formation is confusion about the
fundamental value of the asset. In particular, the results from our study, together with those
from other papers (which we will discuss in more detail in the next section), suggest that mis-
pricing tends to occur whenever there is a conflict between the sign of dividend payments and
the sign of the time slope of the fundamental value: overpricing tends to occur with positive
dividend payments and decreasing fundamental values, and underpricing tends to occur with
negative dividends and increasing fundamental values.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. We discuss related literature in section 2,
describe the experimental design in section 3, analyze the experimental results in section 4,
and conclude in section 5.
2 Related Literature
Following the seminal paper by SSW, the experimental literature on asset bubbles has
largely followed two directions (see Palan 2013 for a detailed survey of the literature). The
first is to keep the same fundamental value specification as in SSW and try to find measures to
reduce bubbles. King et al. (1993) examine the effect of allowing for short-sales, using non-
student subjects, transaction fees, equal endowment and price-change limits; these measures
are ineffective in eliminating bubbles.4 Fisher and Kelly (2000) introduce two simultaneous
asset markets and find that bubbles exist in both markets. Fischbacher, Hens and Zeisberger
(2013) and our paper study the case with interest payment on cash; both studies suggest
that paying interest on cash in itself is ineffective in eliminating bubbles. Rigid measures to
curb trading are more effective in reducing or eliminating bubbles; such measures include
removing speculative opportunities and diverting subjects’ attention from the asset market
to a commodity market (Lei, Noussair and Plott 2001), reducing liquidity or controlling for
cash/asset ratio (Caginalp, Porter and Smith 1998, 2001; Fischbacher, Hens and Zeisberger
2013; and Kirchler, Huber and Stöckl 2012) and imposing holding caps (Lugovskyy et al.,
2012). Different trading mechanisms have also been studied. Van Boening, Williams and
LaMaster (1993) find that bubbles continue to occur in call markets. Lugovskyy, Puzello
and Tucker (2011) show that the Tâtonnement mechanism is effective in reducing bubbles.
4Ackert et al. (2006) and Haruvy and Noussair (2006) also study the effect of short sales.
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Cheung and Palan (2012) find that trading teams reduce the bubble phenomenon compared
to individual traders.
The second direction of the experimental research on asset bubbles contends that the fun-
damental value generating process in the SSW is conducive to misunderstanding and bubble
formation. Except for our study, the existing literature focuses on the effect of the time trend
of the fundamental value. Most studies use a framework without interest on cash. Smith,
van Boening and Wellford (2000), Noussair, Robin and Ruffieux (2001), Huber, Kirchler and
Stöckl (2012), and Kirchler, Huber and Stöckl (2012) study the case with flat fundamental val-
ues assuming zero expected dividend payment, and find that overpricing is greatly reduced.
Huber, Kirchler and Stöckl (2012) also study the case with increasing fundamental values
by assuming negative dividend payments and find underpricing in this situation.5 Bostian
and Holt (2009) conduct a classroom experiment using a framework with interest payment
on cash. They study a single regime which features a flat fundamental value induced by
equating the buyout value to the ratio of expected dividend payment over the interest rate,
and observe frequent occurrences of bubbles. Our study exploits the flexibility created by the
introduction of interest on cash and includes three different fundamental value processes.6
There are two explanations about how the fundamental value process affects trading be-
haviors, both focusing on the effect of the time trend of the fundamental value. First, as
pointed out by Smith (2010) and Oechssler (2010), subjects may find it hard to comprehend
the decreasing fundamental value in the SSW design, because asset prices tend to increase or
stay constant in the long run in real life. Huber, Kirchler and Stöckl (2012) provide a second
explanation, proposing that anchoring on information generated by the trading process drives
under-reaction and in turn mispricing on the experimental asset market. According to this
view, decreasing fundamental values would give rise to overpricing, increasing fundamentals
would lead to underpricing, and flat fundamentals would involve little mispricing. Neither
of the two view is fully compatible with all existing studies. In particular, the results in the
two studies with interest on cash – Bostian and Holt (2009) and our study – provide evidence
against either explanation. According to Smith (2010) and Oechssler (2010), there should
5Noussair and Powell (2010) and Breaban and Noussair (2014) examine environments where the fundamen-
tal value experience different time trends during the trading game. Noussair and Powell (2010) conduct two sets
of experiments. In the "peak" treatment, fundamentals first rise and then fall, while in the "valley" treatment
fundamentals first fall and then recover. They find that bubbles still occur in both treatments, but in smaller
magnitudes in the peak treatment. Breaban and Noussair (2014) study markets in which a trend in fundamentals
sets in after an interval of constant value. They find that prices tend to track fundamentals more closely when the
trend is decreasing, than when it is increasing. Breaban and Noussair (2014) conclude that the contrast between
their results and those from previous studies indicate that the timing of the onset of a trend in fundamentals is
an important feature influencing how the trend affects the price discovery process.
6Fischbacher, Hens and Zeisberger (2013) also have interest on cash. In their design, the interest rate changes
in response to prices, making it difficult to define the fundamental value. Fischbacher, Hens and Zeisberger
(2013) do not focus on the effect of fundamental value dynamics.
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be great overpricing in our treatment N with decreasing fundamentals and no mispricing in
Bostian and Holt (2009) with a flat fundamental. However, there is on average slight under-
pricing in our treatment N and frequent bubbles in Bostian and Holt (2009). According to
the explanation suggested by Huber, Kirchler and Stöckl (2012), there should be underpric-
ing or negative bubbles in our treatment R with increasing fundamentals, positive bubbles
in our third treatment with decreasing fundamentals and no mispricing in Bostian and Holt
(2009) with a constant fundamental value; the prediction is inconsistent with the experimental
results.
We propose a third explanation that suggests both the time trend of the fundamental value
and the sign of the expected dividend payment affect mispricing. In particular, mispricing
tends to occur whenever there is a conflict between the sign of dividend payments and the
sign of the time slope of the fundamental value: overpricing tends to occur with positive
dividend payments and decreasing fundamental values, and underpricing tends to occur with
negative dividends and increasing fundamental values. This new explanation is consistent
with all existing studies, including our own.
There is also a strand of studies that keeps the same fundamental value generating pro-
cess as in SSW, but adopts various measures to help subjects understand the process. One
measure is to allow subjects to repeat the experiment. Many studies, including SSW, King et
al. (1993), Van Boening, Williams and LaMaster (1993), Dufenberg, Lingqvist and Moore
(2005), and Hussam, Porter and Smith (2008), find that past experience with the same game
significantly reduces the magnitudes of bubbles.7 Lei and Vesely (2009) include a pre-trading
phase where subjects hold the asset and experience dividend flows. Kirchler, Huber and
Stöckl (2012) change the context from "stocks" to "stocks of a depletable gold mine." Huber,
Kirchler and Stöckl (2012) display the fundamental value on the trading screen. These salient
measures are found to be effective in eradicating bubbles. Porter and Smith (1995) find that
the existence of a futures market, in which contracts are realized at the half way point of
the trading horizon, helps to reduce but does not remove asset bubbles. A follow-up study
by Noussair and Tucker (2006) finds that the futures markets can eliminate bubbles if the
contracts are such that there is one maturing in each period of the life of the asset.
Finally, there are also a few papers that study asset bubbles with indefinite horizons. For
example, Camerer and Weigelt (1993) study asset markets where subjects trade stochastically-
lived assets that pay a dividend each period and live from period to period with a known prob-
ability; they find that asset prices converge slowly to the fundamental value. On the other
7The effect of experience only applies if subjects repeat the same game. The effect will disappear if there
is a large shock to the environment, such as liquidity and dividend uncertainty as in Hussam, Porter and Smith
(2008), and reshuffling of subjects and admission of new subjects as in Xie and Zhang (2012).
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hand, in a classroom experiment, in which an asset with constant fundamental value was
traded in an indefinite horizon, Ball and Holt (1998) found systematic overpricing. In Hens
and Steude (2009), the dividend process follows a random walk with a positive drift which im-
plies that the fundamental value depends on the dividend realization in the current period (the
paper does not investigate the problem of mispricing). Kose (2013) finds that concerns about
bankruptcy risk (the asset becomes worthless once the game ends randomly) cause under-
pricing irrespective of the time trend of the fundamental value. Crockett and Duffy (2013)
and Fenig, Mileva and Peterson (2014) consider general equilibrium economies. Crockett and
Duffy (2013) find that in an environment where subjects are induced to adjust share holding
in order to smooth consumption, assets trade at a discount relative to the risk-neutral funda-
mental price. In Fenig, Mileva and Petersen (2014), subjects are induced to maximize their
utility from consumption and leisure, and at the same time engage in speculative activities in
the asset market; they find asset prices consistently grow above the fundamental value and do
not decline significantly with learning.
3 Experimental Design
The major departure from the SSW design is the introduction of interest payments or
charges on cash holdings. Within this framework, we can study whether positive interest pay-
ment on cash, which increases the opportunity cost of asset-market speculation, will reduce
speculation and bubbles on the asset market. We can also investigate the effect of different
fundamental value generating processes, taking advantage of the flexibility created by the
introduction of interest on cash.
Shares have a finite life of T periods. Each share pays a random dividend at the end of
each period from time 1 to T; plus a fixed buyout value, K; at the end of period T . The
distribution of the dividend is iid over time. The expected value of the dividend is fixed at d.
If d < 0, we interpret it as carrying cost. In each period, cash earns interest or bears charges
at the net rate of r. When r > 0, we interpret that cash is parked in an interest-bearing
savings account. When r < 0, we say cash is placed in a banking account that charges
proportional banking fees. Subjects can use money from the savings/banking account to
purchase shares. Revenues from share sales, carrying cost of shares and banking fees are
automatically deposited into or deducted from the savings/banking account. Following the
usual practice in the literature, we define the fundamental value as the holding value for a
risk-neutral agent (the fundamental value for a risk-averse agent is lower). The fundamental
value of the asset at the beginning of period t is calculated as the net present value of all
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remaining dividend payments and the buyout value at the end of T , i.e.,
FVt = d
"
T t+1X
=1
(1 + r) 
#
+K(1 + r) (T t+1)
=
8<: d(T   t+ 1) +K if r = 0;d=r + (K   d=r) (1 + r) (T t+1) if r 6= 0:
The time trend of the fundamental value is given by
d(FVt)
dt
=
8<:  d if r = 0;(K   d
r
)[ln(1 + r)](1 + r) (T t+1) if r 6= 0:
Note that in the absence of r (or if r = 0), the time trend of the fundamental value is
fully determined by the sign of the dividend payment (negative dividend payments can be
interpreted as carrying costs). If d > 0 as in the SSW design, the fundamental value must
decrease over time. To generate a flat fundamental value, d must be equal to 0 as in Smith,
van Boening and Wellford (2000), Noussair, Robin and Ruffieux (2001) and Kirchler, Huber
and S et al. (2012). To induce an increasing fundamental value, d must be negative as in
Huber, Kirchler et al. (2012). The introduction of r allows for more flexibility. In particular,
it is possible to have increasing fundamental values with d > 0 (for example, by setting r > 0
and K > d=r) and decreasing fundamental values with d < 0 (for example, by setting r < 0
and K > d=r).
Using the above framework, we investigate two possible factors that may contribute to
irrational trading. The first is the "active participation hypothesis" raised by Lei, Noussair
and Plott (2001). We would like to study whether paying positive interest on cash holdings,
which increases the opportunity cost of speculation on the asset market, will reduce trading
and overpricing of the asset. The second is the fundamental value generating process. As
discussed earlier, existing studies (except our paper) focus on the effect of the time slope of
the fundamental value, but the time slope itself cannot explain the results in all studies. We
conjecture that the way to generate the time slope is also important. Taking advantage of
the flexibility created by the introduction of interest on cash, we run three treatments with
different combinations of the interest rate, dividend payment, the buyout value, and the time
slope of the fundamental value. We have run a total of 19 sessions. The detailed information
for each session is listed in table 1.
In the first treatment, cash earns positive interest payment with r = 10% or 15%.8 The
8The interest rate of 10% or 15% seems to be unrealistically high. Because subjects play with small stakes
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dividend payment has four possible realizations, 0; 8; 28, and 60, with equal probabilities,
which implies a positive expected dividend payment with d = 24.9 The buyout value K is
set to be less than d=r to induce a decreasing fundamental value. This treatment is labeled
"F" to reflect the falling fundamental value. We run six experimental sessions (sessions F1-6)
of this treatment. The second treatment is similar to the first treatment in terms of interest
and dividend payments, but withK > d=r, which implies increasing fundamentals. We label
the second treatment "R" to capture the rising fundamental values. We run seven treatment-R
sessions (R1-7). The third treatment has interest charges on cash holdings with r =  10%
and negative dividend payments interpreted as carrying costs with d =  24 (the dividend is
equal to 0; 8; 28, or  60 with equal probabilities), the buyout value, K, is set at 500, and
the fundamental value decreases over time. We label the treatment "N" to reflect the negative
dividend and interest payment. There are six sessions (N1-6) of this treatment.
Treatment F differs from a standard SSW design in that cash earns positive interest (both
designs have positive dividend payments and decreasing fundamental values). Therefore,
we can use the result from treatment F to evaluate whether increasing the opportunity cost of
asset trading by paying positive interest on cash is effective in eliminating bubbles through the
reducing-active-participation channel. In addition, if bubbles are observed only in treatment
F, but not in treatment R, we can infer that the main reason for the different results from the
two treatments is due to the different fundamental value process.10
To examine the effect of the fundamental value generating process, we compare the results
from all three treatments, together with the results from other papers that study the effect
of alternative fundamental dynamics, including Smith, van Boening and Wellford (2000),
Noussair, Robin and Ruffieux (2001), Bostian and Holt (2009), Huber, Kirchler and Stöckl
(2012), and Kirchler, Huber and Stöckl (2012). Our purpose is to find an explanation to
reconcile all existing studies on the effect of fundamental value generating processes.
The program used to conduct the experiment is written in z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007).
See the Appendix for the experimental instructions. There are 9 or 10 subjects participating
in each session trading a single asset called "shares". Communication among subjects is
prohibited during the experiment. The number of trading periods, T , is 15 except for session
R7, which has 12 trading periods. Each trading period lasts for 150 seconds. Subjects are
given the opportunity to practice with the trading interface. There is also a training period
during which subjects familiarize themselves with the task that they will perform. Each
in the experiment, we set the interest rate at conspicuously high levels to induce meaningful response from
subjects.
9Some treatments in SSW feature the same dividend distribution.
10The result that substantial overpricing occurs only in treatment R, but not in treatment F, is unlikely to
occur.
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subject starts the first formal trading period with the same endowment of shares and cash.
The share endowment for each subject is 4. The amount of cash endowment is chosen to
control for the initial cash/asset ratio, which ranges from 1 to 2:5 in treatment F, 1 to 3 in
treatment R, and 6:65 to 8:32 in treatment N.11
Following the usual practice of the literature, we provide subjects with a table to list the
holding value of a share in terms of cash. The trading mechanism is a continuous double
auction with open order books. Subjects initiate a transaction by posting offers to buy (bids)
and offers to sell (offers). Each offer is for the transaction of one share, but subjects can
post multiple offers to buy or sell. Active orders to buy and orders to sell are ranked in two
separate columns, with the best available offers at the bottom of the lists. Subjects execute a
trade by selecting the best order and press the "buy" or "sell" button located at the bottom of
the order book. To facilitate the comparison between our results and those from other papers
that study the effect of interest payment and the fundamental value dynamics, we adopt the
same design to ban short sales of shares and borrowing money to buy shares. The sessions
were conducted from October 2011 to March 2012 at two universities, University Pompeu
Fabra (UPF), Barcelona, and University of International Business and Economics (UIBE),
Beijing. Each session of experiment lasts for about 90 minutes. The average earning is 13
Euros at UPF and 100 RMB at UIBE.
4 Experimental Results
We document the experimental results in figures 1-3 and tables 2-8. Before discussing the
experimental results, we first describe the content of information in these figures and tables.
Figures 1-3 plot the time series of the fundamental value (FVt), the median trading price
(Pt) and the trading volume (Nt) for each session of experiment.12 The six sessions with
treatment F are graphed in figure 1. Figure 2 contains the seven treatment-R sessions. The
six treatment-N sessions are represented in figure 3. The horizontal axis indicates the trading
period running from 1 to 15. Prices are depicted along the left vertical axis: the solid line is
the path of Pt, the dashed line represents FVt, the upper dotted line indicates (1+30%)xFVt,
and the lower dotted line represents (1  30%)xFVt. The two dashed lines serve as reference
lines to visualize the extent of mispricing. The trading volume is graphed against the right
vertical axis in circles.
11Caginalp, Porter and Smith (1998, 2001) suggest that the effect of cash/asset ratio is stronger in early
periods of the experiment.
12We use the median trading price instead of the average trading price because the former is less affected by
errors made by subjects while posting offers.
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Table 2 provides four statistics to quantify the trading behavior. We provide the statistics
for each individual session, and the treatment statistics (in bold face) averaged across sessions
of the same treatment. There are three statistics to measure price deviations: relative absolute
deviation (RAD), relative deviation (RD) and price amplitude (PA). The fourth statistic,
share turnover (ST ), measures trading intensity. The four statistics are calculated as follows.
Let FV =
 
TX
t=1
FVt
!
=T be the average lifetime fundamental value. Denote the number of
outstanding shares asN0, which is equal to 40 in sessions with 10 subjects and 36 in sessions
with 9 subjects. The relative absolute deviation RAD =
 
TX
t=1
jPt FVtj
FV
!
=T measures the
average level of mispricing relative to the average lifetime fundamental value of the asset. The
relative deviation RD =
 
TX
t=1
Pt FVt
FV
!
=T measures the extent of over or under-valuation.
The price amplitude PA = max
1tT
[(Pt   FVt)=FV ]   min
1tT
[(Pt   FVt)=FV ] measures the
overall size of mispricing. The share turnover is calculated as ST =
TX
t=1
(Nt=N0). Note that
we use the average lifetime fundamental value, FV , to calculate the three measures of price
deviation. As discussed in Stöckl, Huber and Kirchler (2010), it is more appropriate to use
FV (than FV1 as in many studies) for comparison among different experimental settings,
especially among treatments with different time paths of the fundamental value.
Table 3 presents the results from two-tailed Mann-Whitney tests that compare the trad-
ing patterns of the different treatments. Each session is counted as one observation of the
treatment: there are six observations for treatment F, seven observations for treatment R, and
six observations for treatment N. The test is performed for each of the four trading statistics
and for each pair of the three treatments. A total of 12 tests (four statistics and three pairs)
are conducted. For each test, we list the average treatment statistic for the pair of treatments
being compared, the Z-statistic, the p-value of the Z-statistic, and the combined sample size
of the pair of treatments.
In table 4, we identify the incidence of bubbles. We use a commonly adopted rule in the
literature: we say that a bubble occurs in a session if the median transaction price exceeds the
fundamental value by at least x% for more than five consecutive periods (see for example,
Noussair, Robin and Ruffieux 2011). Table 4 lists the number of bubbly sessions for each of
the three treatments for x = 30, 40, and 50.
Finally, tables 5-7 provide information about individual trading behaviors. In particular,
we check the extent of "fundamental trading" for each subject. We say a transaction or offer is
"fundamental" if the price is (1+30%)xFV for share purchases, and (1 30%) xFV for
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share sales. We then measure the extent to which an individual is a fundamental trader by the
percentage of fundamental transactions and offers that the individual engages in across the
session. Table 5 lists the information for each individual subject who participated in each of
the 17 sessions. We provide session-level and treatment-level statistics in table 6. The session
statistic is calculated as the median of the individual statistics for subjects who participated in
that session. The treatment-level statistic (in bold face) is the average of session statistics for
sessions belonging to the same treatment. Table 7 shows the results from the Mann-Whitney
test of the three treatments using the session-level statistics as observations.
4.1 Description of Experimental Results
Now we describe the experimental results. It is clear from figure 1 that the median trading
price frequently exceeds the fundamental value (and the (1+ 30%)xFV line) in sessions with
treatment F. In contrast, in sessions with treatment R, the median trading price closely tracks
the fundamental value most of the time. For treatment N, except for two sessions N2 and N6,
the median trading price does not deviate substantially from the fundamental value: the line
for median trading price lies within the (1 30%)xFV band most of the time.
From table 2, which provides the trading statistics, one can see that treatments R and
N have on average mild underpricing (relative to the risk-neutral fundamental value): the
average treatment RD is  0:3% for treatment R and  0:9% for treatment N. In contrast,
treatment F exhibits substantial overpricing with the average treatment RD being high at
72:3%. In terms of general mispricing, treatment R involves the smallest deviation from
the fundamental value (the treatment average RAD is 11:1%), followed by Treatment N (the
treatment average RAD is 20:9%). Treatment F exhibits substantial mispricing: the treatment
average RAD is 76:6%. The price amplitude is very high in treatment F averaged at 148:6%
compared with 44:5% for treatment R, and 92:2% for treatment N. The three treatments have
comparable trading intensity: the share turnover is 5:151 for treatment F, 5:661 for treatment
R, and somewhat higher at 7:034 for treatment N.
Table 3 shows the result from Mann-Whitney tests on RAD, RD, PA and ST. The tests
suggest that treatment F generates statistically higher mispricing, mainly in the form of over-
pricing, than the other two treatments. In terms of RAD, which measures overall mispricing,
the test between treatments F and R has a Z-value of 3, and the test between treatments F
and N gives a Z-value of 2:82: In terms of RD, which measures overpricing, the test between
treatments F and R has a Z-value of 3, and the test between treatments F and N has a Z-value
of 2:722. All four tests have a p-value of 0%.13 The tests on PA suggest that treatment R
13Note that the RADs for all seven treatment-R sessions are universally lower than those for all six treatment-
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involves much smaller price fluctuations than the other two treatments. The comparison be-
tween treatments F and N are not statistically different with a p-value of 26%. Finally, in
terms of trading intensity, measured by share turnover, the three treatments are not statisti-
cally different: the tests between treatments F and R, F and N, and R and N, have a p-value
of 67%, 75% and 67%, respectively.
In terms of the number of bubbles (see table 4), we find that all treatment-F sessions have
bubbles if we define a bubble as the situation where the median transaction price exceeds
the fundamental value by at least 30% or 40% for more than five consecutive periods (i.e.,
x = 30% or 40%). Even if we increase x to 50% (which tends to give a low bubble count),
there are still five bubbly sessions out of the six treatment-F sessions. There are no bubbles
in treatment R using all three rules. For treatment N, two sessions (N2 and N6) have bubbles
if we set x = 30% (which tends to give a high bubble count), one session (N6) has a bubble
if x = 40%, and there are no bubbles if x = 50%.
From tables 5-7, we can see there are more fundamental traders in treatments R and N
than in treatment F. For example, among the 70 subjects who participate in the seven sessions
of treatment R, the percentage of fundamental transactions is 80% for 80% of the subjects
(remember that in a fundamental transaction, the purchasing price is  (1 + 30%)xFV and
the sale price is  30%) xFV). In contrast, among the 59 participants in the six sessions
of treatment F, only 14% of subjects have more than 80% of fundamental transactions. For
treatment N, among the 57 participants, 72% have more than 80% fundamental transaction,
which is much higher than the 14% in treatment F, but somewhat lower than the 80% in
treatment R. The treatment average percentage of fundamental transactions is 94% for treat-
ment R, 87% for treatment N, and 61% for treatment F. The treatment average percentage of
fundamental offers is 99% for treatment R, slightly lower at 95% for treatment N and much
lower at 84% for treatment F.14 The Mann-Whitney test shows that the difference between the
three treatments in terms of the percentage of fundamental trading and posting is statistically
significant.
To summarize, treatment F involves substantial mispricing in the form of overpricing,
while treatments R and N involves on average much lower mispricing and very mild under-
pricing. The three treatments are not significantly different in terms of trading intensity.
F sessions. The same pattern applies to RD (see table 2).
14The data in tables 5 and 6 show a regularity that subjects follow the fundamental value more closely while
posting offers than trading.
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4.2 Effect of Interest Payments on Cash
We first check whether paying positive interest on cash helps to reduce bubbles by in-
creasing the opportunity cost of speculation on the asset market.
Note that treatment F differs from a standard SSW design in that cash earns positive
interest (both treatments have positive dividend payments and decreasing fundamental val-
ues). Since treatment F involves significant overpricing (as with the SSW design), we can
conclude that paying interest on cash is not sufficient to suppress overpricing through the
reducing-active-participation channel. The result is consistent with the findings in previous
studies that have interest payment on cash. Bostian and Holt (2009) observe that bubbles
frequently occur in an environment where cash earns positive interest and the fundamental
value is constant. Fischbacher, Hens and Zeisberger (2013) investigate the effect of monetary
policy in correcting mispricing by raising (cutting) the interest rate when the trading price is
above (below) the fundamental value throughout the whole trading session. They find that
raising the interest rate can not eliminate bubbles.
In addition, a comparison between treatments F and R suggests that active participation
is not the reason why bubbles (do not) appear in treatment F (R), because the two treatments
share similar trading intensity. A more likely reason for bubble formation is confusion about
the fundamental value process.
4.3 Effect of the Fundamental Value Generating Process
Given that the fundamental value generating process plays a critical role in the formation
of bubbles, the next step is to identify features of the fundamental generating process that are
responsible for the occurrence of bubbles.
One explanation, as formulated in Smith (2010) and Oechssler (2010), is that since asset
prices tend to increase or stay constant in the long run in real life, subjects may find it difficult
to comprehend that the fundamental price of the asset could decrease over time. According
to this explanation, we should observe little overpricing in treatments with flat or increasing
fundamental values. This explanation is consistent with some studies, but conflicts with
others. For example, Smith, van Boening and Wellford (2000), Noussair, Robin and Ruffieux
(2001), Huber, Kirchler and Stöckl (2012), and Kirchler, Huber and Stöckl (2012) find that
bubbles are greatly reduced or disappear with a flat fundamental value, and our treatment
R shows there are no bubbles with increasing fundamental values; these results support the
explanation. On the other hand, Bostian and Holt (2009) find positive bubbles with a flat
fundamental value, Huber, Kirchler and Stöckl (2012) find underpricing or negative bubbles
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with increasing fundamental values, and our treatment N has decreasing fundamental values
but no substantial overpricing; these results are inconsistent with the explanation.
Huber, Kirchler and Stöckl (2012) provide another explanation. They conduct an exper-
iment with increasing, decreasing and flat fundamental values (in the absence of interest),
induced by a positive, negative and zero expected dividend payment, respectively. They find
no bubbles with a flat fundamental value, positive bubbles with decreasing fundamental val-
ues and negative bubbles with increasing fundamental values. As a result, Huber, Kirchler
and Stöckl (2012) propose that anchoring on information generated by the trading process
drives under-reaction and in turn mispricing on the experimental asset market. Again, this
explanation is consistent with some studies, but incompatible with others. According to the
explanation, there should be negative bubbles in our treatment R, no bubbles in Bostian and
Holt (2009) and positive bubbles in our treatment N. However, there is minimal mispricing
in our treatment R, significant overvaluation in Bostian and Holt (2009) and no substantial
mispricing in our treatment N.
To identify the source of confusion, we investigate in detail the fundamental value gener-
ating process, in particular, the way in which each paper controls the time trend of the funda-
mental value of the traded asset. In papers that feature environments without interest payment
on cash, the time trend of the fundamental value is determined by the sign of the expected
dividend payment, d. A constant fundamental value requires d = 0 as in Smith, van Boen-
ing and Wellford (2000), Noussair, Robin and Ruffieux (2000), Huber, Kirchler and Stöckl
(2012) and Kirchler, Huber and Stöckl (2012). More specifically, in Smith, van Boening and
Wellford (2000), shares do not pay dividends. In Noussair, Robin and Ruffieux (2000), the
positive dividend is offset by a carrying cost, which implies a zero net expected dividend. In
Huber, Kirchler and Stöckl (2012) and Kirchler, Huber and Stöckl (2012), the dividend fol-
lows a random process with a zero expected value. To achieve increasing fundamental values,
d has to be negative as in Huber, Kirchler and Stöckl (2012), who find undervaluation in this
treatment. If d > 0 as in a standard SSW design, the time series of the fundamental value
has a decreasing trend, and bubbles frequently appear in this setting. Bostian and Holt (2009)
and our paper study the formation of bubbles in environments where cash earns interest. The
time trend of the fundamental value is determined by three parameters: K, d and r. Bostian
and Holt (2009) achieve a flat fundamental value by setting K = d=r with K; d; r > 0. The
fundamental value increases over time in our treatment R with K; d; r > 0 and K > d=r. In
treatment F, we have K; d; r > 0 and K < d=r. In treatment N, we have K > d=r > 0 with
d < 0 and r < 0.
Based on the above observations, we propose a third explanation: mispricing tends to oc-
cur whenever there is a conflict between the sign of the time trend of the fundamental value
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and the sign of the expected dividend. Subjects are more likely to perceive that the value
of the share should increase if it pays a positive dividend, decrease if the dividend is nega-
tive and remains flat if the dividend is zero. The hypothesis is compatible with the results
from all existing studies. In Smith, van Boening and Wellford (2000), Noussair, Robin and
Ruffieux (2000), Huber, Kirchler and Stöckl (2012), and Kirchler, Huber and Stöckl (2012),
the fundamental value is flat and d = 0, the trading price tend to follow the fundamental value
well. In the SSW design, Bostian and Holt (2009) and our treatment F, the time slope of the
fundamental value is negative or zero, but the dividend is positive; this conflict induces over-
valuation or positive bubbles. In our treatment R (N), both the time slope of the fundamental
value and the expected dividend payment are positive (negative); the extent of overpricing
is in general small. In the increasing treatment in Huber, Kirchler and Stöckl (2012), the
fundamental value increases over time but the dividend is negative, a conflict that results in
undervaluation or negative bubbles.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we investigate the formation of price bubbles in an experimental asset mar-
ket with interest payments or charges on cash holdings. We investigate two aspects of SSW
design that may have contributed to irrational trading on experimental asset markets: low
opportunity cost of speculation and confusion about the fundamental value.
We have run three treatments. In the first two treatments (treatments F and R), cash earns
positive interest payment, and stocks pay positive expected dividends. The difference lies in
the dynamics of the fundamental value. In the third set of experiment (treatment N), banking
fees are charged on cash holdings, the expected dividend is negative (interpreted as carrying
costs), and the fundamental value decreases over time. We find no bubbles in treatment R,
substantial overpricing in treatment F, and mild underpricing in treatment N. There is no
significant difference in terms of trading volume among all three treatments.
The results suggest that paying interest on cash is not likely to reduce asset bubbles
through the reducing-active-participation channel, and the occurrence of bubbles is mainly
due to confusion about the fundamental value of the asset. In order to identify the source of
confusion, we investigate in detail the designs of existing studies, including our own three
treatments, with a particular focus on the way how each study controls the time trend of the
fundamental value. We offer a new explanation that bubbles tend to occur whenever there is a
conflict between the sign of the time trend of the fundamental value and the sign of expected
dividend payments. This new explanation is consistent with all existing studies.
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Table 1
Parameters used in the experiment
Treatment Session Date Location Subjects Trading periods Dividend
Initial 
shares
Initial 
cash
Interest 
rate (r)
Buyout 
(K) FV 1 FV 15
FV 15 /
FV 1 CA 1
F1 12/16/11 UIBE 10 15 (0,8,28,60) 4 2000 0.1 72 200 87 0.44 2.50
F2 12/23/11 UIBE 10 15 (0,8,28,60) 4 2000 0.1 72 200 87 0.44 2.50
F3 02/10/12 UPF 9 15 (0,8,28,60) 4 1022 0.1 0 183 22 0.12 1.40
F4 02/16/12 UPF 10 15 (0,8,28,60) 4 1054 0.1 24 188 44 0.23 1.40
F5 03/12/12 UPF 10 15 (0,8,28,60) 4 827 0.15 60 148 73 0.49 1.40
F6 03/20/12 UPF 10 15 (0,8,28,60) 4 591 0.15 60 148 73 0.49 1.00
R1 10/28/11 UPF 10 15 (0,8,28,60) 4 2000 0.1 720 355 676 1.91 1.41
R2 11/07/11 UPF 10 15 (0,8,28,60) 4 2000 0.1 720 355 676 1.91 1.41
R3 11/07/11 UPF 10 15 (0,8,28,60) 4 2000 0.1 720 355 676 1.91 1.41
R4 03/30/12 UPF 10 15 (0,8,28,60) 4 4259 0.1 720 355 676 1.91 3.00
R5 11/04/11 UIBE 10 15 (0,8,28,60) 4 2000 0.15 720 229 647 2.83 2.19
R6 01/27/12 UPF 10 15 (0,8,28,60) 4 2000 0.15 720 229 647 2.83 2.19
R7 01/23/12 UPF 10 12 (0,8,28,60) 4 745 0.15 300 186 282 1.52 1.00
N1 07/17/12 UPF 9 15 (0,-8,-28,-60) 4 50000 - 0.1 500 1503 529 0.35 8.32
N2 09/10/12 UPF 10 15 (0,-8,-28,-60) 4 50000 - 0.1 500 1503 529 0.35 8.32
N3 09/12/12 UPF 9 15 (0,-8,-28,-60) 4 50000 - 0.1 500 1503 529 0.35 8.32
N4 09/19/12 UPF 10 15 (0,-8,-28,-60) 4 40000 - 0.1 500 1503 529 0.35 6.65
N5 10/15/12 UPF 9 15 (0,-8,-28,-60) 4 40000 - 0.1 500 1503 529 0.35 6.65
N6 10/23/12 UPF 10 15 (0,-8,-28,-60) 4 40000 - 0.1 500 1503 529 0.35 6.65
Note:
CA 1  stands for initial cash/asse ratio
N
R
F
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Table 2
Statistics based on the median trading price
Session RAD RD PA ST
F1 0.805 0.805 1.918 3.050
F2 0.451 0.449 0.675 3.725
F3 1.033 1.033 1.711 5.778
F4 0.573 0.573 0.766 6.625
F5 1.333 1.282 2.724 5.550
F6 0.401 0.196 1.124 6.300
Treatment F Average 0.766 0.723 1.486 5.171
R1 0.099 0.008 0.467 8.275
R2 0.142 0.042 0.811 4.250
R3 0.031 0.003 0.211 4.475
R4 0.042 -0.020 0.181 7.425
R5 0.035 0.035 0.080 2.500
R6 0.316 -0.009 1.043 7.425
R7 0.110 -0.079 0.319 5.275
Treatment R Average 0.111 -0.003 0.445 5.661
N1 0.209 -0.199 0.850 14.000
N2 0.339 -0.070 1.529 4.875
N3 0.170 0.021 0.788 4.361
N4 0.073 -0.002 0.638 4.425
N5 0.151 -0.095 0.887 9.917
N6 0.308 0.294 0.830 4.625
Treatment N Average 0.209 -0.009 0.920 7.034
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Table 3
Mann-Whitney tests of RAD, RD, PA and ST
RAD RD PA ST
F 0.766 0.723 1.486 5.171
R 0.111 -0.003 0.445 5.661
    Z-value 3.000 3.000 2.429 -0.429
    p -value 0% 0% 1% 67%
    Sample size 13 13 13 13
F 0.776 0.723 1.486 5.171
N 0.209 -0.009 0.920 7.034
    Z-value 2.882 2.722 1.121 -0.320
    p -value 0% 0% 26% 75%
    Sample size 12 12 12 12
R 0.111 -0.003 0.445 5.661
N 0.209 -0.009 0.920 7.034
    Z-value -1.857 0.714 -2.000 -0.429
    p -value 6% 48% 5% 67%
    Sample size 13 13 13 13
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Table 4
Incidences of bubbles
Number of Sessions with Bubbles
30% rule 40% rule 50% rule
F 6 6 6 5
R 7 0 0 0
N 6 2 1 0
Treatment Number of Sessions
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Table 5
Percentage of fundamental trading and posting -- individual subjects
Session Player
% Fundamental 
transactions
% Fundamental 
offers
Session Player
% Fundamental 
transactions
% Fundamental 
offers
Session Player
% Fundamental 
transactions
% Fundamental 
offers
1 50 52 1 78 95 1 70 83
2 100 100 2 93 100 2 81 82
3 56 92 3 92 100 3 86 92
4 64 75 4 96 99 4 72 100
F1 5 50 74 R1 5 88 100 N1 5 85 88
6 58 88 6 92 100 6 93 96
7 31 84 7 100 100 7 71 80
8 50 63 8 99 100 8 86 94
9 78 71 9 72 100 9 97 98
10 64 66 10 77 99
1 53 79 1 100 100 1 59 95
2 68 66 2 100 100 2 50 100
3 95 100 3 100 100 3 87 99
4 56 87 4 100 98 4 79 100
F2 5 42 97 R2 5 100 100 N2 5 57 94
6 100 100 6 100 100 6 63 93
7 57 88 7 100 99 7 100 100
8 64 85 8 100 100 8 36 78
9 83 92 9 89 93 9 95 98
10 93 100 10 100 100 10 81 100
1 69 73 1 100 100 1 92 98
2 75 66 2 100 100 2 91 100
3 62 83 3 100 100 3 83 98
4 59 56 4 100 100 4 91 95
F3 5 58 82 R3 5 64 94 N3 5 90 99
6 55 92 6 100 100 6 92 99
7 57 77 7 100 100 7 74 96
8 100 88 8 100 100 8 91 97
9 71 97 9 100 100 9 88 96
10 99 100
1 28 96 1 93 100 1 94 93
2 40 89 2 99 100 2 91 100
3 53 77 3 100 100 3 98 100
4 52 71 4 95 100 4 78 94
F4 5 53 67 R4 5 100 100 N4 5 100 100
6 55 82 6 100 100 6 100 100
7 27 100 7 100 100 7 100 100
8 79 77 8 83 98 8 100 100
9 50 86 9 86 n/a 9 98 98
10 76 92 10 100 100 10 94 98
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Table 5 (continued)
Percentage of fundamental trading and posting -- individual subjects
Session Player
% Fundamental 
transactions
% Fundamental 
offers
Session Player
% Fundamental 
transactions
% Fundamental 
offers
Session Player
% Fundamental 
transactions
% Fundamental 
offers
1 82 90 1 100 100 1 65 64
2 58 52 2 100 100 2 91 98
3 67 76 3 100 100 3 86 95
4 56 85 4 94 100 4 95 100
F5 5 64 61 R5 5 78 100 N5 5 81 94
6 70 47 6 96 100 6 88 89
7 60 92 7 100 100 7 87 92
8 71 84 8 100 100 8 100 100
9 69 100 9 100 100 9 100 100
10 63 72 10 89 97
1 48 100 1 70 94 1 78 50
2 59 98 2 65 99 2 88 83
3 74 86 3 77 n/a 3 75 71
4 47 90 4 73 87 4 96 91
F6 5 79 94 R6 5 90 100 N6 5 92 95
6 64 94 6 74 91 6 64 100
7 54 90 7 71 79 7 89 100
8 73 100 8 64 100 8 84 94
9 63 75 9 69 97 9 78 80
10 87 100 10 83 86 10 90 73
1 99 99
2 75 95
3 96 97
4 100 100
R7 5 88 100
6 97 100
7 100 100
8 97 99
9 100 100
10 100 100
28
Table 6
Percentage of fundamental transactions and offers -- session and treatment
Session Transactions Offers
F1 57 74
F2 66 90
F3 62 82
F4 52 84
F5 66 80
F6 64 94
Treatment F average 61 84
R1 92 100
R1 92 100
R2 100 100
R3 100 100
R4 100 100
R5 100 100
R6 72 94
R7 98 100
Treatment R average 94 99
N1 85 92
N2 71 98
N3 91 98
N4 98 100
N5 88 95
N6 86 87
Treatment N average 87 95
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Table 7
Mann-Whitney test of fundamental transactions and offers
Median (% fundamental transactions) Median (% fundamental offers)
F 61 84
R 94 99
Z-value -3.046 -3.085
p -value 0% 0%
Sample size 13 13
F 61 84
N 87 95
Z-value -2.887 -2.406
p -value 0% 2%
Sample size 12 12
R 94 99
N 87 95
Z-value 2.103 2.178
p -value 4% 3%
Sample size 13 13
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Appendix: Experimental Instructions (Treatment R) 
Part A: General Instructions 
You are taking part in an experiment on investment behavior. If you follow the instructions 
carefully and make the right decisions, you can earn some money, which will be paid to you 
at the end of the experiment.  
The experiment consists of a sequence of trading periods, each one lasting for 150 seconds. 
During each period, you will make decisions to invest your money between two forms of 
investment: shares of stocks of a fictitious Company, and a savings account. The currency 
used in the market is called EURUX, which will be converted into Euros at the end of the 
experiment. The conversion rate is 1000 EURUX for 1 Euro. 
The experiment will proceed in the following sequence. First, we will show you the trading 
interface you will use (you will practice with it as we explain), and then we will discuss the 
features of the two forms of investments. After that, you will have the opportunity to practice 
trading for one period. We will then give you further instructions and information to help you 
make trading decisions. If anything is unclear during the instructions or practice, you can 
raise your hand and ask the administrator whatever question you may have. 
Before the experiment formally starts, you will be required to complete a quiz to demonstrate 
that you have a complete and accurate understanding of these instructions. After you have 
completed the quiz, the administrator will check your answers and discuss with you any 
question that has been answered incorrectly. 
TRADING INTERFACE 
In each trading period, you start with some money invested in two forms of investment: 
savings account and shares. Money in the savings account earns interest and shares earn 
dividends (interest and dividend will be described later).  
During each trading period, you make investment decisions to allocate money between the 
two forms of investment:  you can use money in the savings account to buy shares, or sell 
shares and deposit the revenue in your savings account. Here is a sample trading screen.  
 
A 
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The top left corner shows the current trading period, and the top right corner shows how 
much time (in seconds) is left in the current period. Your investment portfolio – money in 
your saving account and the number of shares you own – are shown in the middle of the 
screen. On this screen you can buy or sell shares in four ways. 
First, you can initiate a sale of shares by submitting an offer to sell. 
If you have shares, you may choose to sell them. You can initiate a sale in the text area below 
“Enter offer to sell” in the first column. Here you can enter the price at which you are 
offering to sell a share. To send the offer, you have to click the “Submit offer to sell” button. 
After that, your offer to sell will appear in the second column labelled “Offers to sell”. Each 
offer introduced corresponds to one single share. If you want to sell more shares, repeat this 
process. 
Note that by submitting an offer to sell, you initiate a sale, but the sale will not be executed 
until someone accepts it. 
Try offering to sell a share now. Write a number (integer) in the text area labelled “Enter 
offer to sell” and then click on the button “Submit offer to sell”. You can see that a set of 
numbers will appear in the column labelled “Offers to sell”.  Each number corresponds to an 
offer from one of the participants. Your own offers are shown in blue; others’ offers are 
shown in black. The offers to sell are ranked from high to low, so that the cheapest (best) 
price is displayed at the bottom of the list. 
Second, you can realize a purchase of shares by accepting an offer to sell. 
If you have enough money in your savings account, you can buy a share at one of the prices 
in the “Offers to sell” column (which also contains your previously submitted offer to sell). 
You buy a share by selecting one of the others’ offers (shown in black) and then clicking on 
the red button “Buy”. Note that you are not allowed to accept your own offers, which are 
shown in blue. Remember that the cheapest (best) price is displayed at the bottom of the list. 
It may happen that when you select the best price and press the “Buy” button, someone else is 
doing the same thing but acting slightly faster than you. In that case, a message “someone has 
been faster than you” will show up.  
Try buying a share now. Choose a price in the column “Offer to sell” and then click on the 
“Buy” button; or directly click on the “Buy” button and buy at the cheapest price listed in the 
column “Offers to sell”. 
Whenever an offer is accepted, a transaction is executed. Immediately when you accept an 
offer to sell, you realize a purchase and the number of EURUX in your savings account goes 
down by the trading price; at the same time, your trading partner realizes a sale and the 
balance in his/her savings account increases by the trading price. In contrast, when your offer 
to sell is accepted, you realize a sale, your trading partner realizes a purchase, and money is 
transferred from your trading partner’s savings account to your savings account by the 
amount of the trading price. 
Given that you all submitted one offer to sell and accepted one offer to sell, you all realized 
one purchase and one sale so you have the same number of shares as you started out with. 
Third, you can initiate a purchase of a share by submitting an offer to buy. 
If you have money in your savings account and would like to buy a share, you can initiate the 
purchase by submitting an offer to buy. Enter a number in the text box under “Enter offer to 
buy” situated on the right side of the screen and then click on the “Submit offer to buy” 
button. 
Try submitting an offer to buy a share now. Write a number in the text area “Enter offer to 
buy.” Then press the red button labelled “Submit offer to buy”. Immediately in the column 32
labelled “Offers to buy” you will see a list of numbers ranked from low to high, so that the 
highest (best) price is displayed at the bottom of the list. If you want to sell more shares, 
repeat this process. Again, your own offers are shown in blue; others’ offers are shown in 
black. 
Fourth, you can realize a sale of a share by accepting an offer to buy. 
You can sell a share at one of the prices offered in the “Offers to buy” column (which also 
contains your previously submitted offer to buy). Select one of the offers and then click on 
the red button “Sell”. Again, note you are not allowed to accept your own offers (shown in 
blue). Remember that the highest (best) price is displayed at the bottom of the list. 
Try selling a share now. Choose a price in the column “Offer to buy” and then click on the 
“Sell” button. 
Again, a transaction is executed whenever an offer to buy is accepted. If you accept an offer 
to buy posted by others, you realize a sale and as a result, the amount of EURUX in your 
savings account increases by the trading price. In contrast, when your offer to buy is accepted 
by someone else, you realize a purchase and the number of EURUX in your savings account 
decreases by the trading price. The reverse happens to your trading partner. 
You can see that the these four trading methods are complementary: you can initiate a trade 
by offering a price to sell or buy and wait for the offer to be accepted by others; you can 
execute/realize a trade by accepting an offer to buy or sell submitted by other participants. 
In the column situated in the middle of the screen and labelled “Trading price”, you can see 
the prices at which shares have been traded during the trading period by all participants 
present in the market. 
 
The above is the trading interface you will use during the experiment. In the following, we 
will give more instructions about the two forms of investment. After that, you will have time to 
practice a full trading period. Do not press the “continue” button until the instructor tells 
you so.   
 
DIVIDEND AND INTEREST 
At the end of the trading period, you receive dividends for the shares you hold, and interest 
on money in your savings account. Both dividends and interest are automatically added to 
your savings account. 
Dividend. The amount of dividend per share is determined by a random device (the 
Company’s business may go well or bad, which will affect how much dividend you get) and 
takes one of four values with the same probability: 
1/4 probability you get 0 EURUX per share, 
1/4 probability you get 8 EURUX per share, 
1/4 probability you get 28 EURUX per share, and 
1/4 probability you get 60 EURUX per share 
Each participant gets the same dividend per share. There is a new random dividend draw for 
each new trading period.  
Since all four outcomes are equally likely, we can calculate the average dividend as (0 + 8 + 
28 + 60)/4=24 EURUX. 
Interest. The money in your savings account earns interest rate at 10% per period.  
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Here is an example to illustrate how dividends and interest are paid. Suppose after trading, 
you have 2 shares and 1000 EURUX in your savings account. The random device shows that 
each share receives a dividend of 28 EURUX. At the end of the period, you will receive 
28x2=56 EURUX of dividend and 1000x10%=100 EURUX of interest. As a result, the 
balance in your savings account at the end of the period will be 1000+56+100=1156. 
 
END-OF-PERIOD INFORMATION SCREEN 
At the end of the trading period, after dividends and interest are paid and deposited in your 
savings account, you will be shown an “information screen” which includes the information 
about dividend and interest payment. The screen also includes the information about your 
end-of-period inventory of shares and the balance in your saving account. 
 
The “information screen” contains the following information: 
1. Period: the period just finished 
2. Your shares: number of shares you own after trading in the period 
3. Savings account balance before dividend and interest: amount of EURUX you have in your 
savings account right after trading and before dividend and interest payment 
4. Dividend per share: the amount of dividend in EURUX you receive for each share you own. 
5. Total dividend: calculated as Your shares x dividend per share. 
6. Interest: net amount of interest you receive in the period for money in your savings account, 
which is calculated as Savings account balance before dividend and interest x 10%. 
7. Savings account balance after dividend and interest: money in your savings account after 
dividend and interest have been paid and deposited, which is calculated as Savings account 
balance before dividend and interest + Total dividend + Interest 
TRIAL 
In the next 3-4 minutes you will practice trading in this market for one period. Your actions 
in this period will not count toward your earning in this experiment and do not influence your 
position in the real experiment.  
Now, please click on the “Continue” button on your screen and we will start the trial. 
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Now that you know how to trade shares and how dividends and interest are paid, before the 
experiment formally starts, let us go through some instructions to help you maximize your 
earnings in the experiment. 
 
The experiment consists of 15 consecutive trading periods. Each period will last for 150 
seconds. You start period 1 with a certain investment portfolio of shares and money in your 
savings account. In each of the 15 trading periods, you trade among yourselves using the 
interface you just practiced with. At the end of each trading period, you see the “information 
screen” which shows your end-of-period portfolio position after dividend and interest 
payments.  
Your inventory of shares and savings account balance carry over from one period to the next.  
For example, if at the end of period 4 you have 2 shares and 1000 EURUX. You start period 
5 with the same portfolio of 2 shares and 1000 EURUX before trading. 
The game ends after 15 periods. If you own some shares at the end of period 15, the 
Company will purchase your shares at a buyout value of 720 EURUX per share.  
For example, suppose after trading in period 15, you own 3 shares and 2000 EURUX. At the 
end of period 15, after dividend and interest payment, you can sell your shares to the 
Company at the buyout value. If the dividend payment is 8 EURUX per share, you receive 
3x8=24 EURUX as dividends. The interest payment is 2000x10%=200 EURUX. Your 3 
shares are sold to the Company for 3x720=2160 EURUX. Your total earnings in this game 
are calculated to be 2160+24+200+2000=4384 EURUX, which will be converted into Euros.  
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Part B: HOLDING VALUE TABLE 
The objective of your investment decisions is to maximize your end-of-game total earnings. 
In each trading period, you decide how to allocate your money between the two forms of 
investment: shares and savings account.  
To facilitate your decision-making, we provide you a table called “Holding value table” (See 
next Page), which can be used through the entire experiment. The table calculates the average 
value of a share if you buy it in the current period and hold it until the end of the game. Of 
course, you may choose not to hold the share until the end of the game, if, for example, you 
can sell it at a good price before the end of the game. The holding value table is just for your 
reference. 
The table has 6 columns, which we will go through one-by-one. 
1. Current period: The current trading period.  
2. Average dividend: The average amount of dividend per share per period. This, as explained earlier, 
is equal to 24 EURUX. 
3. Average remaining dividends:  If you hold 1 share of stock until the end of the game, you will be 
entitled to a dividend payment at the end of each of the remaining periods. The remaining dividend 
is calculated as the total amount of money you will accumulate at the end of the game if you 
deposit all dividend payments into your savings account which earns 10% interest per period. For 
example, for each share you hold in period 14, there are two remaining dividend payments: one at 
the end of period 14, and one at the end of period 15. You deposit the period 14 dividends in your 
savings account, which will increase your money balance at the end of the game by 24x1.1=26.4 
EURUX. The period 15 dividend is paid at the end of the game (so will not earn interest) and will 
increase your end-of-game money balance by 24 EURUX. The average remaining dividends is 
calculated as the sum of the two amounts = 26.4+24=50.4 EURUX. 
4. Buyout value. At the end of game, each share you own will be purchased by the Company at 720 
EURUX. 
5. End average holding value. The average amount of EURUX you will receive at the end of the 
game if you hold one share for the remainder of the experiment. It is calculated as the sum of 
average remaining dividend (column 3) and the buyout value (column 4). For example, the 
average holding value I for a share in period 14 is calculated as 50.4+720=770.4 EURUX.  
6. Current average holding value. To buy a share in the current period, you have to use money 
currently in your savings account. When you make the buying decision, you may want to know 
the average holding value of a share measured in terms of money in the current savings account. 
Call this the current average holding value. Let us illustrate how to calculate the value by an 
example. Suppose you are trading in period 14. One EURUX in the current saving account will 
generate 1.12 (there are two remaining interest payments) units of EURUX at the end of the game. 
Holding one share generates (on average) 770.40 EURUX at the end of the game. Holding one 
share is thus (on average) equivalent to holding 770.40/1.21=637 EURUX in the current savings 
account.  
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Holding Value Table 
1 
Current 
period 
2 
Average 
dividend 
3 
Average  
remaining dividends 
4 
Buyout 
value 
5 
End average                
holding value 
6 
Current average                
holding value  
1 24 762.54 
 
1482.54 355 
2 24 671.40   1391.40 366 
3 24 588.55 
 
1308.55 379 
4 24 513.22   1233.22 393 
5 24 444.75 
 
1164.75 408 
6 24 382.50   1102.50 425 
7 24 325.91 
 
1045.91 444 
8 24 274.46   994.46 464 
9 24 227.69 
 
947.69 486 
10 24 185.17   905.17 511 
11 24 146.52 
 
866.52 538 
12 24 111.38   831.38 568 
13 24 79.44 
 
799.44 601 
14 24 50.40   770.40 637 
15 24 24.00 720 744.00 676 
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Part C: Quiz 
 
Please read carefully the Holding Value Table and make sure that you understand it. Raise 
your hand whenever you have any questions. When you think you understood the table, 
please answer the following questions: 
1. Suppose you are in period 5. How much is the average dividend you should expect at the end 
of this period?  ________ 
2. Which is the maximum and minimum dividend you can get in any period? _________ 
3. Suppose you are in period 5 and a share pays the average dividend in each of the remaining 
periods. The current holding value of one share in terms of money in the current savings 
account is ______.  
4. Please explain on one sentence or two what the current holding value is. 
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